IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TATTNAL COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

 

 

Michael Harold Chapel,

          Petitioner,

 

     Vs.

 

Hilton Hall, Warden,

Georgia State Prison,

          Respondent

 

 

 

     Case No: 2000-HC-45

 

     HABEAS CORPUS

 

 

 

NOTICE OF APPEAL

 

 

            Comes now Michael H Chapel and hereby gives notice of his appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia of the decision in the instant case which decision was filed on 20 August 2001.

            The Clerk will please include the entire record on appeal, including Habeas Corpus Evidentiary hearing Transcript; all documentary evidence admitted and all pleadings submitted to the court. Nothing should be omitted from the record on appeal.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MICHAEL H. CHAPEL

EF - 349322

Applicant – Pro se

Georgia State Prison

Reidsville, GA 30499


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 

STATE OF GEORGIA

 

 

Michael Harold Chapel,

          Applicant,

 

     Vs.

 

Hilton Hall, Warden,

Georgia State Prison,

          Respondent

 

 

 

     Case No: 2000-HC-45

 

     HABEAS CORPUS

 

 

 

APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

           

MICHAEL H. CHAPEL

EF - 349322

Applicant – Pro se

Georgia State Prison

Reidsville, GA 30499

 


ENUMERATION OF ERROR

 

I.          FINDINGS OF FACT

            The Habeas Court erred in its identification of Paul Omodt as having identified Chapel in the driveway of Gwinnco Muffler.

 

On April 15th, several witnesses saw the victim’s car parked in the driveway of a local muffler shop. Some of the witnesses saw a marked patrol car, variously described, parked beside or behind the victim’s car. Although it was raining, Paul Omodt, a passenger in a car driving by the muffler shop, was able to identify the officer in the patrol car as Petitioner, and also testified that he saw Petitioner drive past him a few minutes later[1].

 

            Witness Paul Omodt did not testify as described by the Habeas Court. Omodt was the driver of a vehicle in which another witness, Karl Kautter, was a passenger. Omodt and Kautter were the only witnesses to see the officer outside of his patrol car in the driveway[2]. Neither of these witnesses could identify the officer in the driveway, and both described a much smaller man than Chapel[3]. As a patrol car passed the Omodt/Kautter vehicle, it was Karl Kautter who identified Chapel, but that identification was never more then tenuous. When shown the photo lineup although his identification was tentative[4]. Kautter first pointed to another officer then stating that if he had to choose, Chapel would be his choice. At the preliminary hearing, Kautter was shown photographs of all 31 officers at the Northside Precinct, and his first selection was Officer J. P. Morgan[5], an officer that killed himself a few weeks after Chapel’s arrest. At trial, it was not clear whom Kautter was identifying[6], intimating again that the officer in the patrol car that passed them was J. P. Morgan.

            Kautter and Omodt described the officer in the driveway as either walking toward or standing next to the victim’s car in the driveway. The Habeas Court describes a patrol car passing the pair “a few minutes later”. At trial, Witness Kautter described the point where the patrol car came up behind their vehicle as the point where Peachtree Industrial Boulevard transitioned from two to four lanes[7], a point approximately 500 feet north of the Gwinnco Muffler driveway[8]. At the testified-to forty-five (45) miles per hour the witness car was traveling, the Omodt/Kautter car would have traveled that distance in six (6) seconds. It would clearly have been impossible for the officer in the driveway to return to his patrol car, back out onto Peachtree Industrial Boulevard and catch up with the witness car as they reached the two to four-land transition[9].

            The Habeas Court erred in not noting an analysis that showed that it would have been physically impossible for Chapel to physically have been present in the muffler shop driveway at the time the patrol car was seen behind the victim’s car.

 

At trial conflicting evidence was presented regarding Petitioner’s whereabouts during the time the patrol car was observed beside the victim’s car. There was also evidence that Petitioner responded to a call at 10:07 P.M…[10]

            The Habeas Court erred in its description of “several drops of blood” found in Chapel’s patrol car.

 

DNA tests of several drops of blood recovered from Petitioner’s patrol car revealed that the blood came from the victim, although the test’s accuracy and probative value was hotly disputed. It was also noted that Petitioner’s patrol car was left unsecured in a police parking lot for a week before being tested for the presence of blood[11].

 

             The amount of DNA extracted from the stain on the upper part of the patrol car’s armrest was described as from 50 to no more than 100 nanograms[12]. Extrapolating the size of the stain from the amount of DNA retrieved, the stain had to have been less than 0.5 cm[13], hardly the size of a stain that would have been left by several drops of blood. The Habeas Court neglects to mention that the blood stain in Chapel’s vehicle was on the top of the patrol car’s passenger armrest, a place where the blood could not have been accidentally located because the armrests were always kept in the “up” position[14]. The reason that the armrests were kept in the “up” position was that they interfered with access to the pursuit pack on the passenger seat, the vehicle’s CB Radio, the mobile display terminal (MDT – the patrol car’s computer), and, as Chapel is right-handed, access to his weapon[15]. Additionally and suspiciously, since the crime scene technicians had searched Chapel’s patrol car several time previously, the upper part of the armrests was the only area they had not yet examined.

            The Habeas Court erred its evaluation of the Petitioner’s financial problems and transactions at or near the time for the murder.

 

Evidence was presented that the Petitioner was facing possible financial problems due to a pending IRS audit, that Petitioner made two purchases with hundred-dollar bills the next day, and that Petitioner’s wife was seen soon after with an envelope containing a large number of one-hundred dollar bills[16].

            There was real evidence presented at trial as to the source of the six one hundred-dollar bills that Chapel used to make a purchase of previously ordered advertising T-shirts for his gym[17]. Jack Dudley, a Chapel friend and sometime employer had given Chapel $1,400.00 in one hundred-dollar bills weeks before the murder as an investment in Chapel’s gym[18]. The testimony of Valerie Heath, who testified at trial that Chapel had used a one hundred-dollar bill to pay for a car wash, was impeached by a statement she made at her first police interview that Chapel had paid for the car wash with a twenty-dollar bill[19]. The testimony of Kendon Curtis should have been countered by Eren Chapel, wife of the Petitioner, but she was inexplicitly persuaded not to testify by defense counsel. The monies that Curtis saw while rifling Mrs. Chapel’s purse were her tips as a waitress and contained no hundred-dollar bills[20].

            The Habeas Court is in error regarding the possibility for DNA testing of blood on Chapel’s raincoat.

 

Evidence was presented that blood, apparently human, was found on the Petitioner’s raincoat, but that the blood could not be tested for DNA because it had been contaminated with the victim’s blood while in police custody. A state expert testified that the blood showed a pattern of “high velocity splatter,” consistent with having shot someone at close range[21].

             

            There were several small stains on Chapel’s raincoat discovered and identified by Jennifer Wilson, a GBI serologist on July 7, 1993[22]. Attempts to retrieve DNA could have been made. After the raincoat’s contamination with the victim’s blood in the GBI Crime Lab, Kelly Fite, a GBI tool mark and bullet marking technician, but not a serologist, made his blood splatter [sic] analysis[23]. It must be noted that Fite made his blood spatter analysis after the raincoat had been contaminated, reducing if not destroying any probative value of that analysis because his analysis included stains that resulted from the GBI Crime Lab contamination.


CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

 

            The Habeas Court has seen fit to renumber and re-label the grounds and issues as presented in Petitioner’s amended petition of December 20, 2000; the effect of this dichotomy is purely technical. For example, the Court’s Ground 4, the “Brady” gunpowder residue issue is excluded as an attempt to relitigate[24] and the Ground 4  “Brady” withheld witness testimony issue is excluded as having been waived[25]. The “Brady” issue of the victim’s purse found months after the trial being withheld for 8 months could not fall under either of these exclusion issues and is simply ignored.

 

            Citing Gunter v. Hickman, the Habeas Court includes as those issues already litigated, i.e., raised and decided, in the Petitioner’s direct appeal:

 

Ground 1:         Sufficiency of the evidence. Chapel at 152-53 [Petition Ground 5];

 

Ground 3:         Newly discovered evidence. Chapel at 153, 154, 159 [Petition Ground 7];

Ground 4:         Brady violation (gunpowder residue, Chapel at 156 [Petition Ground 8];

Ground 5:         Improperly admitted evidence (hearsay and raincoat). Chapel at 154-55 [Petition Ground 9];

Ground 12:       Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel (trial only), Chapel at 158-160 [Petition Ground 15].

 

                        In Gunter v. Hickman, only the general issue of sufficiency of evidence and the specific issue of “insufficiency of corroboration of accomplice testimony” was being offered, and that issue had been raised and decided in direct appeal. In Chapel, there is a multiplicity of issues most of which were not raised and decided in direct appeal. Can then Gunter v. Hickman be used to summarily dismiss the voluminous, wide-ranging and never litigated issues brought by Chapel?

                        Citing Turpin v. Lipham[26] and Black v. Hardin[27], the habeas Court dismisses the following grounds as having failed to be raised at trial or on direct appeal:

 

Ground 2:         Conspiracy by the State [Petition Ground 6];

Ground 4:         Brady violation (allegedly withheld alibi witness testimony [Petition Ground 9);

Ground 5:         Admission of videotape of Petitioner’s interview with police [Petition Ground 9];

Ground 6:         Suppressed telephone and computer records [Petition Ground 8];

Ground 7:         Illegal photo lineup [Petition Ground 10];

Ground 8:         Prosecutorial Misconduct Petition Ground 12];

Ground 9:         Judicial and Jury Misconduct [Petition Grounds 13 and 14];

Ground 10:       Speedy Trial Claim [Petition Ground 3];

Ground 11:       Excessive Bail Claim Petition Ground 4].

Not Listed:       Police Misconduct [Petition Ground 11]

Not Listed:       Collusion [Petition Ground 16].

 

            Turpin v. Lipham presupposes that a habeas petitioner has an option, i.e., chooses to not raise an issue at trial or on direct appeal and therefore defaults the issue on habeas corpus. With the majority of these issues, and for good reason, Petitioner Chapel was unaware of the existence of these issues, and to waive an issue, even implicitly, the Petitioner must be aware of the issue and make a conscious choice not to raise it. It was only after months of analysis during the period July, 2000 through December, 2000, years after the direct appeal had been decided and confirmed, that an analyst doing a line by line study of the transcripts of the hearings and the actual trial came across the information that led to the raising of these issues, and it was only weeks before the hearing began that the synthesis of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel issues inevitably led the analyst to the bizarre conclusion that in fact the District Attorney and the lead defense counsel colluded in bringing about a guilty verdict in this case. The importance of these issues well meet the prejudice criteria defined in Turpin v. Todd[28] of demonstrating actual prejudice that “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”

 

 

 

           

 

           

 

           

 

           

EF – 349322  

MICHAEL H. CHAPEL

Petitioner – Pro se

Georgia State Prison

Reidsville, Georgia, 30499



[1] See Habeas Decision, August 20, 2001, p. 4

[2] See Habeas Petition as amended  (12/20/00), Ground 5,A,8, “Witness Descriptions Of The Officer In The Gwinnco Driveway”, p. 5-19

[3] Ibid, p. 5-19-20

[4] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground 5,D,1, “The Original 8-Photo Lineup”, p. 5-41

[5] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground 5,D,2, “The Preliminary Hearing”, p. 5-41

[6] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground 5,D,3, “Kautter’s Trial Testimony”, p. 5-41

[7] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground 16,A,3, “Kautter’s Trial Testimony”, p. 16-4

[8] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Photo Exhibit P-06 also Back Cover Photograph

[9] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground 5,A,9, “A Second Police Car And Officer”, p. 5-20

[10] See Habeas Decision, August 20, 2001, p.4

[11] See Habeas Decision, August 20, 2001, p.4

[12] See Trial, Examination of Dr. Choi, p. 6056 (Approximate)

[13] See DNA Technology in Forensic Science, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. , 1992, Defense Exhibit D-96, p. 28

[14] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground 6,I, “Blood Evidence Planted In Chapel’s Patrol Car”,  p. 6-27

[15] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Photo Exhibit 6-04, “Chapel’s patrol car with the armrests in the ‘down’ position, and a recently discovered photograph showing the area with the armrests in the “up” position with the equipment in their normal positions. Included as Attachment __ of this document.

[16] See habeas Decision, August 20, 2001, p. 4

[17] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground5,E,2, “Defendant’s Possession Of Money At or Near The Time Of The Murder”, Laurie Pace, p. 6-46

[18]  See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground5,E,1, “Defendant’s Possession Of Money At or Near The Time Of The Murder”, Jack Dudley, p. 6-42

[19]  See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground5,E,2, “Defendant’s Possession Of Money At or Near The Time Of The Murder”, Valerie Heath, p. 6-45

[20]  See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Document Exhibit 5-08, “Declaration of Eren Chapel”

[21] See Habeas Decision, p. 5

[22] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground 6,j,1, “Testimony About The Blood Spatter On The Raincoat Was Perjured”, Jennifer Wilson, p. 6-31; see also See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Photo Exhibit 6-05, “Chapel’s raincoat after testing on July 7, 1993”

[23] See Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Ground 6,j,7, “Testimony About The Blood Spatter On The Raincoat Was Perjured”, Kelly Fite, p. 6-39; see also Habeas Petition as amended (12/20/00), Photo Exhibit 6-08, “Detail of Chapel’s raincoat with markings by Kelly Fite”

 

[24] Gunter v. Hickman, 256 Ga. 315, 348 S.E.2d 644 (1986).

[25] Turpin v. Lipham, 270 Ga. 208, 209, 510 S.E.2d 32 (1988).

[26] Turpin v. Lipham, 270 Ga. 208, 209, 510 S.E.2d 32 (1988)

[27] Black v. Hardin, 255 Ga. 239, 336 S.E.2d 754 (1985)

[28] Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 825, 493 S.E.2d 900 (1997).